SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE * By Special Means *

LN/dem 9 Oct 61 1900 hrs


TO: CJCS

EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN LEMNITZER FROM GEN NORSTAD.

week, I gave assurances on several occasions that there should be no command and control problems with Clay. Certain developments over the weekend have proved me wrong on this point. I feel you should be informed in case this subject is raised through other channels.

You will recall that as of a week ago, developments were generally as follows:

- a. Clay, on his visit to SHAPE, stated his intention to visit Steinstucken. Since he had just arrived from Washington, where he had been briefed and instructed, this proposal was noted without comment here. He did in fact visit Steinstucken shortly after his arrival in Berlin.
- b. Military patrols were established in Steinstuecken on Clay's request to the garrison commander, Watson being absent in Heidelberg. I was informed of this in the first instance by reading the newspaper, and Clarke was in the same position.





- c. Clay requested a movement by ground transport to Steinstucken on Sunday, 2 weeks ago yesterday (24 Sept). This was referred to me by Clarke, who was in Berlin and I denied the request for the reasons given you in an earlier message.
- d. Request was made by the Berlin Commandant to remove refugees from Steinstucken by helicopter, Clay concurring. This was approved and accomplished. Another request of this same type was made at the time I was in Washington, as you know. Again it was approved and accomplished.
- e. On 5 October, notice was received that one refugee had come into Steinstucken. I advised Clarke that he not be picked up for a day or two, until we could determine whether or not there would be others coming in.
- f. Request was received from the Berlin Commandant,
 Clay concurring, to test gates between East and West Berlin other
 than Friedrickstrasse, this to be done by using tour buses or similar
 vehicles on the return trip from East Berlin. Additional information
 was requested from Berlin, particularly as to the prestige and morale
 effects of failure of such probes. On receipt of a further explanation
 on these two points, I approved this action.

On my return to Paris I met with Clarke and Landon to report on the trip and to start the actions that were required to carry out





decisions made. In the course of this meeting, I told Clarke that we hoped that the flow of refugees would taper off quickly, but that we would, for the time being, continue to evacuate them. This would be done, however, on the basis of a specific approval in each instance, since I wanted to avoid creating the impression that we had established a helicopter taxi service for this purpose and thus build up Steinsteucken as a refugee center. I also told Clarke that we would, for the time being, continue the military patrols in Steinsteucken but that when this area was no longer attracting as much public attention, consideration could be given to phasing out this activity.

On Saturday I received the following message from Clay through State channels:

"FROM CLAY FOR NORSTAD ONLY

"My instructions call for the military to advise and consult with me which seems to be interpreted as a formality. I do not understand our timidity which is slowly destroying the confidence of West Berlin. I insist that no order removing patrols from Steinstuecken be issued without advance consultation with me. I assure you I did not come to Berlin to see our position further eroded with excess timidity and caution, nor to be ignored. If this is to continue, I want to know it now.





I shall go into Steinstuecken myself to bring out any refugees there as I am not afraid of escalation."

A message similar in tone was transmitted to Clarke at approximately the same time. I replied to Clay's message with the following:

"FROM NORSTAD FOR CLAY ONLY "Ref Berlin's 490.

"I am concerned by your message contained in referenced telegram. Since cable polemics are not constructive, I suggest we meet in Heidelberg some time next week. Please advise dates convenient to you.


"In the meantime, I request that messages such as COB 436 not be sent to subordinates of mine who are discharging their duties faithfully and effectively and, in doing so, are demonstrating a high degree of intelligence and professional skill."

No reply has been received.

Last night I received a message from Berlin informing me that Clay had taken a helicopter for a reconnaissance, had stopped in Steinstuecken and brought out the one refugee who was there.

If Clay accepts my invitation to a meeting, as I hope he will,

I will do my best to settle this matter at this level. However, the





tone and temperature of Clay's messages suggests the possibility
that he may be deliberately trying to blow up an incident for the
purpose of either gaining complete control in Berlin over established
military and, I assume, State Department authorities or preparing
a foundation for a dramatic exit from a post which he may no longer
regard as a useful or rewarding one.

Since I have not received a reply from Clay, and because of the potential problems involved in this situation, I feel that you should be advised of this development. I request that you bring it to the attention of Secretary McNamara. However, I am not passing the problem up for action, since I propose to do my utmost to settle the matter at my own level.